Forgotten but not gone: slum clearance in Old Bondeni, Nakuru. by Wachtel, Andy
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
2 S o (832) 
(a) UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
(b/) Institute for Development Studies 
Working papers 
FORGOTTEN BUT NOT GONE: SLUM CLEARANCE IN OLD BONDENi; NAKURU 
By 
Andy Wachtel 
WORKING PAPER NO. 153 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
BOX 30197 
NAIROBI, KENYA 
LIBRARY 
1 ~ FEB 2011 
INSTITUTE OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIFS 
March 197^ 
Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should 
not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for 
Development Studies or of the University of Nairobi. 
IDS 
IDS/WP 153 
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ABSTRACT 
Some twenty years after the original quit notices were 
served on plot-holders and their tenants in the then African Location 
of Nakuru, much of "Old Bondeni" is still awaiting demolition. 
This redevelopment seems imminent and during this latest stage of 
planning, it is timely to look at the conduct of this "slum" -
clearance program to see what guidelines it suggests for the current 
program and more generally what insight it provides in terms of urban 
development in Kenya. This paper will deal with several aspects 
of the Bondeni demolition schemes — the policies adopted by the 
municipality, the interpretation of these to the population involved, 
the nature of the response of the affected groups in trying to 
maintain their interests, and in a very general way, the social cost 
considerations in slum clearance programs in small cities like 
Nakuru. 
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Bondeni. 
Some twenty years after the original quit notices were served on 
plot-holders and their tenants in the then African Location of Nakuru, 
much of "Old Bondeni" is still awaiting'demolition. This redevelopment seems 
imminent and during this latest stage of planning, it is timely to look at 
the conduct of this "slum" - clearance program to see what guidelines it 
suggests for the current program and more generally what insight it provides 
in terms of urban development in Kenya. This paper will deal with 
several aspects of the Bondeni demolition schemes - the policies adopted 
by the municipality, the interpretation of these to the population involved, 
the nature of the response of the affected groups in trying to maintain their 
interests, and in a very general way, the social cost considerations in slum 
clearance programs in small cities like Nakuru. 
Bondeni was the name given to all that area which was the African 
Location in Nakuru, about 200 acres of Municipal land at the start of the 
redevelopment program. It was defined legally in schedule 13 of the African 
Locations Bylaws (Cap.136, Gen.N. 1610 of 1938) which along with the Control 
of Africans Bylaws (Cap.136 Gen, N.538 of 1931 and 1168 of 1932) were revoked 
in 1963. It contained two dense areas of temporary housing which were to 
be demolished. The larger of the two was "Old Bondeni" and the smaller was 
the Somali Location (not strictly an African location as the Somalis were 
administratively separate).1 
Both these neighbourhoods started just after the First World War. 
Individuals who had served in the military or had otherwise rendered 
service to the Crown were given in appreciation Temporary Occupation Licenses 
2 
permitting them to erect houses on designated plots. That is to say, the 
municipal authorities retained ownership of the land while licensees owned 
only their houses, which were to be temporary dwellings. The licenses could 
1- For> the significance of-this on redevelopment see page 9 below. 
2. This special relationship to the Crown was to be invoked often 
especially in the case of the Somali Location redevelopment. Two illustrative 
letters are reproduced below in Appendix I. 
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be withdrawn on short notice (3 months) at any time the land might be needed 
for another use but on the other hand there was no set time when that might 
be. In the event the licenses remained in force for more than 30 years." 
The licensees, the large majority of which seem to have been 
Somalis or Muslim Africans, built on their plots typical Swahili-style 
urban housing generally known as 'majengo' housing. These are the roughly 
rectangular mud and stick-walled buildings consisting of a doublebank of 
rooms (sometimes as many as twenty or more but typically in Nakuru of 12 
to 16 or 13) opening onto a central passageway that runs the length of the 
building. Within this arrangement there is considerable flexibility for 
the-owner; front rooms which might be larger and also open onto the street 
were suitable as shops and workshops, smaller rooms were available as stores 
or for other purposes, and rooms could be let singly or in combination by the 
house-owner to families or numbers of individuals. An attractive feature 
for the tenant was that this housing provided both a certain amount of 
privacy (his own door) and quite good security (his room opened onto an 
internal passage and strangers would be noticed by other tenants or the 
houseowner or caretaker). 
/ 
But majengo housing, being temporary, was not subject to the<-"' 
strict control of the locality in terms of building standards. Nor in 
practice were environmental health standards applied to these acknowledged 
'substandard' dwellings - with the result that buildings might be over-
crowded, poorly maintained, with inadequate drainage and sewage. It was 
mainly these public health problems that provoked discussion of demolition. 
The Decision to Demolish — Early Plans. 
The period after World War II saw new urban planning initiatives 
being taken after the years of relative inactivity during the war. The 
population pressures on the town were great and were building up steadily. 
In 1944 a census of the African Locations had disclosed a population of 
over 8,500 (1944 Annual Report). Lack of adequate housing represented a 
threefold problem for the town's development: first of all, a health problem 
3. In that period buildings were sold and inherited, often without 
the new generation of plotholders realizing that they didn't own the plot 
at all. Long use led to the widespread impression that these people, some 
not even licensees in any legal sense, were landlords. This misunderstanding 
was the cause of much acrimony later. 
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caused by overcrowding,' poor sanitation, and so on; a social problem 
represented by high rents for inadequate accommodation, a floating population 
with no permanent abode at all, etc..; and an economic problem in that 
business could hardly be attracted or encouraged to expand if there was no 
place for its labour force to find reasonable lodging in the town. 
In 194-6 the Town Planning Advisor was considering revisions in the 
lay-out of the locations and certain plans were firming up;sites for new 
government and railroad housing for example. However it was to be a slow 
start. The Nakuru Board reported that though "housing accommodation in 
Nakuru (was) acute for all races, until building materials (were) in free 
supply little improvement would be effected. Consideration (would) have to 
be given to alternate building materials and probable relaxation of the 
By-Laws.'1 (1946 Annual Report) The Somali Location represented an especially 
acute problem as the' Somalis "require stock houses, grazing and bomas, a 
potential source of danger and infection to the adjacent labour lines and 
housing.".(1946 Annual Report) 
A provisional development plan was exhibited for public comment 
in 1947. Because there was such a pressing need for housing, a 'temporary' 
substandard scheme (Pangani) was underway and nine 10 room landhies were 
completed and occupied that year. There was a long waiting list. It was 
completed in the next year and added 324 rooms to the housing stock. 
(1947 Annual Report) 
In 1948, the Development Plan was approved by the Board. It set 
out the policy to be adopted with respect to Old Bondeni. 
A large proportion of the houses in this location 
have reached a stage when they are barely fit for human 
habitation. Schemes have been put forward by the 
African Location Planning Sub-Committee and duly 
approved whereby a fresh area is to be laid out 
with plots available to Africans and employers 
of labour, for building in permanent materials on 
a 99 year lease, in accordance with plans approved 
Municipal authorities, investigating conditions in Old Bondeni, were 
surprised at the extent of overcrowding. One notable case was that of a room 
8' x 12' which was occupied by 8 adults, some using it by night and others who 
worked night shift slept^ 'there during the day. (Interview 12/3/74 with Mr. W.H. 
Sayer) 
5. Sanitation problems included, aside from inadequate pit latrines and 
the like, a large number of goats and sheep which created a continuing nuisance. 
(Minutes of the Finance.& General Purposes Committee Meeting 18/6/52) 
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by .the Municipal Board. Facilities will be offered 
to lessees of existing plots in the old Location 
to move to the new area and, at a future date when 
the ground occupied by the present Location has 
recovered, re-building will commence. In the 
meantime, no further building is to be permitted 
in the old Location. The project has been discussed 
by the Nakuru African Advisory Council, when the 
general reaction was extremely favourable. It is, 
however, felt by the Advisory Council that the 
present suggestion that existing temporary occupation 
licenses for plots in the old Location should terminate 
after five years , is too short a period and an extension 
is under consideration. 
A second aspect of municipal policy was also made official that 
year: the budget debate produced a resolution that :!a housing fund be 
started to provide, progressively, housing for labour; first in temporary 
material and afterwards the accumulation of a fund .for building in permanent 
materials for this purpose." (1348 Annual Report) 
The Start: Quit-.Notices.. 
By 1953 the now Municipal Council found itself confronted with its 
own deadline for starting demolition of Bondeni, The housing situation had 
barely eased. The estimated population of Nakuru was 15,000, distributed 
roughly as follows: 
Male 7,000 Bondeni & Somali Loc. 6,000 
Female 4,000 Pangani 1,250 
Children 4,000 New Housing Scheme 750 
15,000 EAR & H 2,500 
Other Estates 1,000 
Town Area 3,500 (1953 Annual Report) 
Housing was a first priority. The council then had provided housing for 
2000 in the Pangani scheme and in the first large-scale municipal housing 
scheme done in permanent materials (Kivumbini I). This latter scheme was 
attracting the interest of other local authorities in that it was designed 
to bridge the gap between urgent short-term needs for bedspaces to house 
single workers and long-term needs for family accommodation. These were 
6. Municipal authorities did give first priority to the provision of 
African housing (although demands for other housing were also great). 
(Minutes of the Housing Committee Meeting 9/6/52) When the five year capital 
expenditure was proposed, £120,000 out of a total of £270,000 was allotted 
to African housing.. (Minutes of the Housing Committee Meeting 9/6/52) This 
was upped to £380,000 designed to build 3960 bedspaces ty the end of 1957. 
(Minutes of the African Affairs Committee Meeting 17/11/52 and Housing 
Committee Meeting 24/11/52) 
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double units of four rooms back-to-back built to be used initially as single-
room accommodation. They could be converted (in the Kivumbini II plan for 
example) into two-roomed units with W.C. and kitchen added on. But because 
7 demand for single rooms remained very high, this was hardly done. 
Then some large employers and especially the railroad had been 
building up their own estates. The Council too was. constructing a second 
housing scheme (Kivumbini II) of the same size and along generally the same 
plan as Kivumbini I. Municipal authorities went to view housing schemes in 
8 
Nairobi, Kericho and Thika. The Council was looking into possible sub-
standard pre-fabricated housing manufactured in Njoro which could be used 9 
on a temporary basis (for a period of not longer than ten years). Yet 
despite all this groundwork, the demolition of Bondeni was a daunting 
prospect. Clearly it could not be done in a single or even a few stages 
considering that the entire five year housing program, even at its most 
ambitious, didn't provide enough bedspaces for this project, (see note 6). 
But some beginning needed to be made. On 31 August 1953 the Council formally 
served "notices of determination of license" on all plotholders in Old 
Bondeni and Somali Locations. This required them to quit their plots and 
deliver them up in one year's time. It was now the job of the Council, 
alter five years of intermittent planning and discussion, not merely to 
arrange the conduct and phasing of the demolition and the related building 
schemes but also to formulate and communicate a clear and comprehensive 
policy to the people concerned. In the event, it was to prove more 
difficult to do the latter. 
The Redevelopment Schemes; Demolition and Debate. 
The redevelopment plan was formulated by the Council in terms of 
the overall development and progress of the town. It therefore was not 
phrased in terms of special interest groups except in so far as it made 
concessions to commerce and industry (in the economic interests of the 
town) and in that it was evolutionary rather than radical (i.e. it was an 
explicitly African redevelopment plan, designed within the limits of the 
racial separation maintained in the colony). In a sense then the plan was 
apolitical; it aimed at the greatest good for the-greatest number, as the 
Council understood this. However because it did threaten the"interests of 
7. Interview with Mr. W.H. Sayer 12/3/74. 
8. Minutes Housing Committee Meeting 1/9/52. 
9. Minutes Town Planning Committee Meeting 5/11/52. 
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some groups, most directly those of the plotholders, it became a matter of 
political debate. In this section I'd like to consider two aspects of the 
political process; how the political claims were put forward and were reacted 
to and how these special interest groups refocused policy concerning 
demolition and redevelopment. With respect to the first there are problems 
of the nature of interaction between groups and government which are perhaps 
still of significance today. And the second., the shift in policy which 
took place also has implications for current redevelopment plans. These two 
aspects, described in this section, will be discussed in the final sections 
of the paper. 
Within a few weeks of the quit notices being served, a letter was 
received by the Council from six plotholders representing the householders 
in Old Bondeni. They asked for a meeting with the Council and Government to 
further consider the matter. The Council responded by putting off the 
meeting while a Kdetailed memorandum . . . outlining the Council's proposals 
for future development of the whole area" was being prepared,1"1" and at a 
12 subsequent meeting chose a committee to attend the meeting with reps from 
13 the locations (one of whom must be a Somali). 
14 
The meeting took plaee before the memorandum was officially out. 
I will set out the main points covered in the meeting in some detail because : 
much the same ground was to be covered in every subsequent meeting. The 
meeting, being only an initial statement and first tentative questioning of 
redevelopment policy, was relatively calm and coherent. Other meetings will 
be. contrasted with this one.,, mainly in terms of the polarization of views and 
the style of interaction. -•••_ 
The meeting was opened by the Mayor who expressed the "earnest wish 
of the Council to assist . . .in every way possible." He then outlined the 
Council's policy: * 
1) In no circumstances could the Council agree to any extension. 
2) No compensation would be considered. 
10. "It is my feeling that the.fact that this debate took place during 
the Emergency only, served to emphasize certain general styles of interaction, 
especially that of paternalism^ 
11. Minutes, Housing & Estates Committee Meeting'21/9/53. 
12. Minutes,-MCN Meeting 5/10/53. 
13. Minutes, Town Planning Committee Meeting 7/10/5.3. 
14. "' This meeting was held on 24/11/53. The Mayor was in the chair, the 
D.C. , the Deputy Mayor, and four Councillors represented the administration, 
while four Bondeni plotholders and one Somali elder represented the licensees. 
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3) Displaced persons would either be offered alternative accommodation in 
municipal housing or on plots of land which they could develop.themselves 
at appropriate standards. 
4) In genuine cases of hardship the Council would consider offering financial 15 
assistance under the terms of the Vasey scheme. 
5) Plotholders " with sufficient funds should consider themselves suitable 
applicants for the Council's tenant purchase type houses. 
6) The Council would give special consideration to those cases where hardship 
was likely to be suffered where elderly men and women were concerned to 
ensure that they would be re-accommodated within the means at their 
disposal. However, the responsibility for elderly people fell primarily 
on their families and each case would be very carefully considered on its 
merits. 
7) To enable the Council to appreciate the circumstances of all residents in 
Bondeni and Somali locations, it had been decided to carry out a detailed 
survey. 
8) It should be clear to everyone that no householder in either location 
possessed any legal title to their plots. 
9) To enable people to develop their own plots in permanent materials it 
was possible that additional land might be included in the location. 
10) The demolition would be carried out in phases, depending upon the land 
requirements of the Council. 
These points answered some of the questions that the householders 
had listed on their agenda. These included requests for an extension of the 
quit deadline from one year to ten years in the case of Bondeni and to five 
years for the Somali Location, compensation for the houses, that landlords 
be given advance warning of demolition, etc. They also made additional 
requests which were referred to appropriate Council committees for consider-
ation. These included the request that leases on.new plots be for longer 
term than the suggested 40 years; that existing shopkeepers be given priority 
in the allotment of tenancies in the new trading centre; that Council permit 
the establishment of shops in the residential areas as well; that individuals 
be allowed to build their houses in stages as their financial situation 
permitted; and that, in view of the fact that many plotholders earned their 
living by the establishment of lodging houses, the Council consider the 
erection of suitable houses for renting or tenant-purchase. 
The memorandum when it came out a week after this meeting turned 
out to be a rather comprehensive plan wherein the demolition of Bondeni was 
only a small piece of a program which envisaged the complete transformation 
15. THE VASEY REPORT, report on housing of Africans in townships 
and trading centres, Nairobi, 1950. 
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of the African Locations — physically, administratively (with village and 
l6 
ward level councils), and socially (with increased responsibility for 
education at all levels, health services, recreation, etc.). This plan 
(which is reproduced in outline in the appendix) represented in the 
main a progressive (if culturally assinilationist) 'liberal' position, 
seeing Kenya society as evolving in the direction of a sort of multi-
racialism (although with some separation of the races) by a process of 
improving the position of Africans so they Would by 'convergence' 
become increasingly 'integrated' into the wider society. While this 
can be taken as the best expression of council policy, it is true that 
Council was never in a position to carry out any such wholesale redevelop-
ment. Particular projects might go in these directions but the 
program as a whole never was to make any impact on the townsfolk; and 
subsequent debate about demolition never was dealt with in the broad 
context of such a redevelopment plan. 
The beginning of demolition came as a great shock to people — 
17 crowds watched the bulldozers do their work. ' Even after the 
18 
planning and the notices, the. meetings and the clarifications, demolition 
had little sense of actuality until it happened. (Perhaps that was 
partly because of the necessarily long discussions: it seemed it could 
be discussed forever.) The first phases of demolition however did not 
create any very organized opposition. Small areas of Old Bondeni were 
cleared (to make room for expansion of social services of various sorts) 
and tenants were moved into municipal housing — Kivumbini II and later 
16 . At the same time these intermediate levels of government, set 
down in this gradualist approach, could be seen as politically unacceptable 
in terms of maturing and more radical African demands. The village council 
was not only an attempt to inculcate notions of modern political process-
but also and quite transparently an attempt to organize and more closely 
supervise and control the African population given the Emergency situation. 
It was also, in effect, a way of defusing African agitation for a stronger 
representation 011 the Council itself where wider policy decisions were made. 
IT. Interview with Mr. S.L. Ojuka 18/3/7^. 
18. From 1953 on, rent receipts from plotholders were endorsed 
with the legend "property subject to demolition, no compensation payable." 
(Letter from Senior D.C. to Secretary for Local Government, Nairobi 
29/6/56.)- • , 
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19 Shauri Yako when it was opened in 1955. A pilot tenant-purchase 
scheme of 12 houses had been built in 195^ - which might have catered for 
(but was not expressly built for) some plotholders who had capital, 
but the terms were not very attractive and plotholders didri1t take it 
20 • up.' Concessions to bona-fide plotholders, i.e., original licensees or 
their dependents, might properly take the form of leasehold plots 
they would develop themselves, (as was argu^ by the resident magistrate 
in his judgement of 22/5/56). But allthe plotholders had not pressed 
their case to the fullest yet. 
Opposition to the program of demolition, increased when the 
council finally came to consider, demolition of the Somali Location. 
.. o o .. o o 
There was several reasons why the Somalis, who in many 
respects didn't differ much from the bulk of Bondeni plotholders 
(who were equally long-term fully-committed urban-dwellers, also 
Muslim', also earning much of their, income from house rents, etc.), were 
able to force their special interests on the attention of the civic 
authorities. The first is that, as they formed a relatively small group 
and were to face demolition all at one time, it was easier for them to 
put up a common fight. Bondeni:plotholders who'might have years-more, 
enjoyment of their housing would not be so likely to form a strong 
common front when-only small sections of Bondeni were being demolished 
in the early phases. 
19- These estate names do tell a story of political conflict of 
a sort which took place in that era. • Kivurabini (in the dust) was 
not a popular name with Council; it symbolized the poor conditions 
that Africans saw themselves, as suffering compared to other groups in 
the-city. Lake Nakuru was nearly dry at the time and acrid soda dust 
blew into the estates (and only to a lesser extent further up into the 
town); hence this name. Shauri Yako (your problem) was suposedly adopted 
as a name in that this housing was to be accepted by people who were 
redeveloped out of a room; finding any alternative was their problem. 
20. Letter from-Senior D.C. to Secretary for Local Government, 
Nairobi, 29/6/56. 
- 1 0 -
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A second major reason is more complex and more interesting 
in terms of the nature of the debate that, ensued: namely, the 
administrative status of the Somalis. The Somalis were not regarded V 
as Africans.by the colonial government, and in part at least, because 
the Somalis grew up with these legal definitions of the British, they 
also saw themselves as apart from the African community. The very 
fact of a specific Somali Location confirmed their separateness and 
reinforced their sense of community. They owed their separate status 
(as they did their plots) to a historical relationship with the Crown; 
a "child of colonialism", one of several sorts that the Kenya colony 
produced. This gave them some additional leverage. Africans, very 
tightly controlled during the Emergency, could not so easily organize 
themselves in opposition to the authorities. Demolition was relatively 
easy for the municipality under those circumstances when Africans had 
to be careful how they responded; Somalis could take a slightly 
different tack. 
The Council knew that the Somalis had political resources to 
fight for their interests. They were anxious not to be embarrassed 
or to have the colonial administration embarrased. The Somalis had 
21 shown their fight in the Bondeni demolitions of 1956 when they 
prevailed upon the Kenya Muslim League to petition against this 
' • ' . ' " ' 22 demolition to government and took the matter outside the local arena. 
The Council therefore took a long time over preliminaries, trying to 
tie the Somalis to various agreements. In a meeting between Council 
representatives, the Divisional Engineer, E.A.R. & H., and Somali 
representatives held on 9/8/57, the plot for the new Somali Location was 
looked at and a general baraza was planned to get Somali approval. 
The Town Clerk approached the Somalis' lawyers, the firm of Shaply, Barret 
and Allen, advocates in Nairobi, to try to arrange for an. irrevocable 
agreement to be signed so as to avoid "any possible misunderstanding when 
the time comes for development, as, from past experience, while the 
Somali Elders have always'proved themselves most cooperative, 
• 23 misunderstandings hare often occurred." 
21. Ibid 
22. Letter revealing this situation from the D.C. Nakuru to 
the P.C. Rift Valley Province lU/7/58. 
23. Letter from the Town Clerk to the Commissioner of Lands, 
Nairobi 15/8/57-
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The Council updated the public health evidence for demolition 
in a report by the Medical Officer of Health, 
On the 16th of June 1958, the Deputy Tovn Clerk ... 
and I made a tour of inspection of the Bondeni and 
Somali Locations... 
... cesspits, pits and rubbish dumps are spread over 
the area... The number of choos is far below that 
necessary for the population. 
The structure of these old dilapidated houses 
is such as to harbour vermin and insects of almost 
all varieties found in human dwellings, and it is 
obvious that were Plague to break out... the entire 
population would have to be moved at once ... only 
demolition with the aid of fire ... could ... make 
the area reasonably safe for building later. 
Overcrowding is at once apparent ... Entire 
families of k or 5 persons are living in single 
rooms, and the party walls are in many cases 
incomplete so that privacy between neighbours 
is quite impossible. 
The water supply is from outdoor standpipes, 
which drift and make the surrounding ground soggy 
.and a place eminently suited for the spread of 
hookworm. 
Ventilation is by chance and not by management; 
cracks in walls ... Many of these cracks are of such 
size as to provide a threat of physical injury to 
children by the falling of building materials on 
them. 
Floors are in almost all cases of mud, and a 
large population of them are at such a level as 
are apt to become water-logged and boggy in wet 
weather. 
The Council also reviewed the administrative and political 
pi. 
pros and cons of the two paths open to them to force demolition; 
the Recovery of Possession of Property Ordinance whereby the whole 
plot is demolished (used in the Old Bondeni demolitions) or the 
Public Health Ordinance whereby each room or family unit would be 
considered a dwelling. The latter method was obviously more cumbersome 
but it was not as politically sensitive.' It was based on relatively 
impartial public health criteria,whereas the first method initially 
2k. 
Com. 
Joint Meeting, -Finance & General Purposes and.Public Health 
- 12 - IDS/WP 153 
demolished some houses entirely, leaving other plotholders in full, 
enjoyment of their rental units for years until the Council could afford 
to demolish them. Using the Public Health Ordinance, a larger number 
of houses could be demolished in part, a group of rooms at a time. So 
it was decided that, this increasingly sensitive program of redevelopment 
would proceed on this latter basis. • : "•' 
Given the fact that the Council had proven its willingness to 
demolish and had the appropriate legal tools to do so, opposition 
was focused not against the demolition itself but against the redevelop-
ment plan in an attempt to push it. in the direction of the interest group 
— in this case the Somali householders. This debate was indeed to force 
the administration, albeit very, grudgingly, to build their plans around 
the rehousing of the plotholders.' In: this regard the minutes of a 
meeting held, between Somali, elders and the Town Clerk .and the D.C. 
are interesting, especially when compared to the meeting' of 2k November 
1953 outlined above,. 
This-meeting was between five Somali representatives on 
one side and the Town Clerk, his Deputy, and the D.C. oh the other. The 
following is an outline of their discussion: ...„' 
The Somali elders stated they had requested the 
meeting to see.the Municipal Council.with regard 
to.promises made to build houses on a hire purchase 
scheme for members of the Somali community. The 
Town Clerk stated at the outset that the Council 
, had not promised to build houses but would try to 
obtain loan funds from the government., . The-Somalis 
reiterated, their version of the story and said that 
the Somali community had agreed to the suggested monthly 
rental of 280/50. 
The Town Clerk repeated that at no time had a 
firm promise been made and further that he had no 
recollection whatsoever of the figure 280/50 per • 
month.. He referred to the information given the 
Somali;elders by the Council's Housing and Estates 
Officer wherein it, had been proved to.the Somalis . 
that the income from a house with nine rooms would 
be 350/- whereas the monthly outgoings would be 
35^/- and for a 12 room house the. monthly income 
would be U95/- and the outgoings 516/75. In view 
of these figures, the Council were satisfied that' 
the proposal to erect rental houses on a hire 
purchase system was "not economically possible. 
- 16 - IDS/WP 153 
The Somalis referred to the alternate 
accommodation available in the number b housing 
scheme and stated they could not afford to pay 
the monthly rent for such houses. They stated 
they would be much happier if they could build 
their own houses in the new Somali Location and 
would agree to pay the Council whatever the Council 
assessed as rent. 
The Town Clerk noted that there was an 
inconsistency here. The houseowners replied that if 
they were to build their own houses, they would -
endeavor to obtain any shortfall from someone else 
who might help them. In the meantime they asked 
whether it would not be possible to defer demolition 
•until some decision on the application for a government 
loan could be received. This was denied. 
The Somalis stated that in these circumstances 
the Council and the government were throwing them 
out on the street as they could not afford a house 
in the new scheme. They had no money and as far as 
they were concerned it was now up to the government 
to do what they liked. 
The.D.C. responded that they were in effect asking " 
to undertake a financial liability over a period of 
20 years. They would have no income whatsoever and 
only face a monthly deficit. The houseowners stated 
that they hoped to make up this deficit from somewhere 
and that this way the houses would be theirs at the 
end of 20 years. The government had originally 
authorized them to live in their present Location 
and as the government row wanted them to move it 
should make available funds for them to build new 
houses. The elders would like to be told how they 
should live, as they had no businesses and they 
were living on the income from rents. 
The D.C. rejected this statement as a complete 
self-contradiction. The elders responded that they 
would just lie in the streets and die .... 
The D.C., noting the fact that the Somali community 
had received not less than five years warning of the 
forthcoming demolition said that they as leaders of 
the Somali community should have made plans to meet 
the situation when it arrived. His best advice for 
them was to build small houses on the plots available 
and as and when they acquired additional funds they 
might consider extending- them. 
This meeting and other similar ones which took place 
afterwards were thoroughly, unsatisfactory as far as the Somalis were 
concerned. Aside from being characterized by a high level of sophistry 
on all sides, it was the unstated propositions that made true dialogue 
impossible. With careful ingenuousness the administration argued 
that the householders could not afford to own rental houses any longer, the 
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the Somalis could only fall back on restatements of their special 
24b 
relationship to the government. There was no way of explicitly 
stating in this atmosphere of piously assumed legality, that rent 
controls or no, the Somalis knew they could derive income from large 
rental houses. That the administration knew this too was obvious as 
was their desire to limit the. possibilities for Somalis. to become 
large-scale renters again, given the many administrative headaches 
caused by many charges of rent abuse levelled against the landlords 
by their tenants and the counter-charges of rent evasion they brought 
against their tenants. 
Their attempts to again widen the arena of debate, as in 
their meeting with the Minister of Housing (on 19/8/58), wherein the 
Minister gravely lectured them on the limits of his ministerial 
authority which did not extend to demolition but only to the 
construction of houses, were thus largely frustrated. Still, the 
. . . 25 
effect of this' extensive politicking, although not all the 
Somalis might have, hoped, was a better deal than previous.plotholders 
had gotten. In the compromise first worked out by the P.C., Somalis 
were given double plots, (many soon divided among an-, enlarged group of 
owners) small 3-room tenant-purchase houses built for them on long-term 
government loans, the houses designed so as to be easily enlargeable 
for rental purposes. Businessmen applied to have business premises 
built into :their dwellings and (at a fee) this was done. Their 
success in getting concessions from the administration should be 
measured not only against that which came before but against the weak 
legal position from which they were forced to argue. Two of the 
recalcitrant houseowners (both non-resident in those buildings) were 
taken to court to try to bring the rest of the community in line, and 
while the senior resident magistrate's judgement- (attached as an appendix), 
24b. See Appendix I. 
25. This included conferences with the F.C., the Minister of 
Housing (above), their firm of Nairobi advocates, the Secretary of 
the Muslim League, the General Secretary of the Nakuru African 
District Congress, Mr. Tom Mboya, etc. (Report submitted to Finance 
& General Purposes Committee 2 8 / 8 / 5 8 . ) 
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a tongue-lajhing of considerable severity which undercut all their 
arguments, might have inclined the community to accept a compromise, 
it is interesting that it didn't do more to push the Council back to 
a central focus 011 the tenants. 
The official opening of the New Somali Location took place 
on 30 May 1959 with considerable fanfare. Invited guests included the 
Ministers of Local Government, and of Housing, the Commissioner of Lands, 
the Director of Surveys and the Town Planning Advisor, an impressive 
list from the national administration, reflecting the scale of 
the political battle ending. 
The last phase of demolition in the Old Bondeni redvelop-
ment scheme thus far took place during and after the Somali Location 
program and was much affected by it. The same legal approach was 
taken by Council, using the Public Health Ordinance provisions, the 
tenants could.go into the 5th Municipal Housing Scheme then going up 
(Kaloleni Estate), and a tenant-purchase scheme was developed for the 
plotholders (plot 73—77)• Businessmen, who wanted to- relocate within 
the residential area (as was allowed to a certain extent in the New ' 
Somali Location), did not get that concession in this case as the 
Council was busy filling a commercial centre to serve the surrounding 
municipal housing estates as a group. This deal seemed to be about 
the best that the plotholders could expect to get and everyone 
seemed willing to work through this phase of Bondeni redevelopment 
26 
without going to court.~ Such an agreement was in fact reached in 
the special subcommittee meeting of the General Ward Council held on 
3/6/59-
There delays though. Landlords argued special problems 
in finding alternative housing for all their dependents, new tenants 
popped up as soon as old ones were rehoused and .claimed to have been there 
all the time (some of these were destitutes and represented a special 
problem in rehousing), and the business parts of two of the houses 
remained long after the rest was down as the business owners dickered 
26. Letter from the Town Clerk to the Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Local Government, Nairobi 31/7/59-
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27 for more time to wind up their affairs, (e.g., one diehard vacated 
his business premises in February 1961 but continued to live-in the 
pg - •" '• " 
back).^ Worse than delays, other sorts of problems came up. Two of 
the six plotholders, owners of plots J6 and 77, didn't join in the 
agreement with Council. Perhaps initially this was because they 
were absentee landlords living in other towns and contact between 
Council and them through their caretakers was poor. In any case it 
was necessary to take all heads of.households in these two houses to . . 29 
court and secure eviction notices. But a more worrisome reason for 
this stubborness was that the tenants of these houses now had cause 
to join with the plotholders in refusing to budge. Because of their 
policy of keeping rents 'economic' in the municipal housing estates, the 
Council found itself forced to raise rents in the new housing estate in 
which these tenants were to be relocated. The tenants, angered by what 
they regarded as an underhanded move, and backed by the Nakuru African 
District Congress, refused to cooperate further and thus Council had 30 
to sort it out through the courts. Thus even in this latest phase of 
demolition, despite all that had gone before that should have led to a 
regularization and routinization. of the development process, issues 
continued to arise which obstructed swift and orderly development. 
The Post-Demolition Phase: 1960/1 to Date. 
I have gone over the various phases of demolition in 
some detail; it is not- my intention to do the same for this period, 
1960 to date. Instead, after noting some of the lines of continuity 
between the pre-independence and post-independence policies regarding to 
Bondeni's redevelopment, I would like/reconsider the above historical 
27. Report on the progress of the demolition submitted by the 
Town Clerk 18/7/60 and letter on remaining demolition from Housing & 
Estates Officer to Town Clerk 22/9/60. 
28. ,; .. .... Letter regarding the tearoom on plot 73 from the Town Clerk 
to the Municipal Medical Officer of Health 22/2/61. 
29. Criminal cases, MCN vs. occupiers of plots 76 and 77, Bondeni 
9/11/59. 
30. Letter from Town Clerk to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Local Government, Health & Town Planning U/ll/59. 
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detail, and try to tie it to certain general problems of formulating and 
putting into effect redevelopment plans. 
This period, broadly the independence period, has seen no 
further demolition, leaving the large bulk of Bondeni standing. Life and 
business go on much as usual with the threat of demolition always 
somewhere in. the background. During the early 1960*s it is my impression 
that the threat was usually far in the background; only kept there by 
occasional debates or recommendations in the section of the annual 
reports on public health. But when it was taken up seriously from time 
to time, the problems were still the same, and that being the case, it 
is not surprising that the proposed policies showed a strong continuity 
with that, part of the pre-independence redevelopment program that dealt 
with the physical aspects of demolition and rehousing. Committees were 
sent out to view other redevelopment programs (most notably one which 
a s s e s s e d the suitability of the Pumwani redevelopment scheme), social surveys 
were conducted to guide planning (one in late 1968 by the Housing and 
Estates Department., updated in 1971 and submitted to the Minister for 
Housing 28/9/71; a second done late in 1973 by the Town Engineer's 
Department ), alternate sites were discussed with plotholders, plans 
were drawn up for tenant-purchase housing for householders, and other 
plans for self-built or mutual-aid housing, site and, service and other 
low income housing are being considered. Meanwhile Old Bondeni has been 
forced to give itself a facelift so that it doesn't represent an 
embarrassment to the town which often plays host to important visitors, 
most notably President Kenyatta who uses State House, Nakuru as his base 
on his official visits to Rift Valley Province. There is again a growing 
determination to redevelop Old Bondeni in the near future. In view 
of this, the initial phases of demolition and redevelopment deseive 
evaluation to see what current relevance they have. The discussion that 
follows attempts this in only very general terms, rather than going 
point by point through the present City Council's program. I prefer to 
be general because the city's program is. still fluid, but more importantly 
because I believe that it is not the concrete details, but the overall 
considerations that are the most intractable. These latter.are the ones 
which are conveniently ignored; they go unmentioned, the former are nece-
sarily worked out in debate. 
3!- _ These social surveys form the basis for a forthcoming.paper 
on changes in the social composition of Old Bondeni. 
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Discission. 
The first part of this discussion deals in a general way 
with some of the social costs arising out of the demolition and 
redevelopment itself. The second part concerns the problems . 
that arise out of the planning, discussion and debate phases. This 
is a sort of commentary on the politics of redevelopment which 
comprise much of the 'historical' sections of the paper. 
A) Some Social Costs of Slum Clearance. 
Slum clearance, like other kinds of social engineering 
projects, often turns out to' have a number of unplanned and unintended 
consequences. And this is true not merely because the plans so 
often have been devised in narrowly physical' or economic terms, 
without any adequate appreciation of the total social context. The 
fact is that the situation is generally so complex, the various sub-
systems inadequately connected within any larger social model, and 
therefore the social scientist too is unable to simulate the cumulative 
effects' of particular sets of policies. Slum clearance programs in 
their wider aspects ('urban renewal' as it is styled in North 
America) have represented very costly and generally not altogether 
successful .'social experiments from which a good deal has been 
learned but mainly in terms of what not to do rather than what is 
effective and humane. Quite similar kinds of dysfunctions were seen to 
be at work in slum clearance projects in the dei^ eloped countries and 
32 .'•••••'"• in developing African situations. I would like to consider 
a number of these social costs of redevelopment in terms of the Bondeni 
case 
1) The costs of enforced stagnation. Once demolition and 
redevelopment are considered for an area, typically a moratorium-
on further building and development in that area is declared. This 
is done so as to simplify matters administratively in terms of dealing 
with requests for compensation or stopping windfall and other 
32. The work of Peter Marris is a good example of somewhat 
parallel findings for rather different social and socio-economic 
settings in England and Nigeria. 
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speculative short-term development, and also to protect members 
of the public on the theory that it is no use encouraging the grafting 
of a new twig onto a rotten tree which will have to come down anyway. 
In the case of Bondeni, the Council was prepared to reject claims 
for direct compensation (although some were made on the grounds that 
33 
recent costly improvements had been made) but there were possibilities 
for gains in short-term developments. For one thing, since the Council 
was committed to rehouse tenants and was disposed to give preference 
to displaced businessmen in the allocation of plots in the new 
commercial areas, there was scope for people to try to capitalize 
on this situation. And in fact the surveys that were undertaken to 
try to tie down the population to whom benefits were due showed that 34 some this sort of thing was occurring. 
But it is the aspect of public protection which is most 
suspect in terms of this policy decision. It is well documented that few 
things will push a neighbourhood into decay, faster than, the decision 
to demolish it. Naturally, not only is new development stopped but 
any incentive there might have been to maintain property is also gone 
and even the legal sanctions designed to enforce minimal compliance 
with regulations become unenforcible. This policy then tends to 
make any reconsideration of the decision to demolish unlikely as, in 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, the area becomes unsalvageable. 
Has this been true of Old Bondeni? Despite the fact that 
development has largely stopped for the last 20 years, it isn't 
easy to say. For one thing, what demolition has taken place has largely 
been at the margins of the neighbourhood, leaving the rest relatively 
untouched rather than creating large gaps in the area. A second 
factor is that it is not clear how much ever went into the maintenance 
of the majengo housing; certainly it wasn't well maintained before. 
By its nature, it is not difficult to maintain at some minimal level if 
patched and plastered; and in that some of the worst housing was 
demolished the remainder might not present today a worse aspect than the 
33. _ Letter from Mr. M. Ali to Town Clerk 16/4/59. This is the 
only remaining building from the old Somali Location (what is now one 
of the railroad estates). It was apparently retained as a concession- to 
the houseowner, a long-term railroad employee, who argued successfully 
that he had put a lot of money into it and it was sound and shouldn't 
be demolished. (Interview with Housing & Estates Officer 12/3/74.) 
34. Letter from Housing & Estates Officer to Town Clerk 22/9/60. 
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neighbourhood of those days. This is not to argue that the area 
had.no'scope1 for decline,.rather the operative fact was that many of 
the houses were owner-occupied or supervised by relatives or dependents 
and so long as the outlay wasn't great compared to the income, housing 
remained at some minimal level (by Council standards sub-minimal); 
the usual sanctions and pressures to maintain the property were.as 
effective or as ineffective as they had been. . 
A second point to consider, given that the area hasn't 
really decayed in any absolute terms, is whether it would have been 
improved were it not under the threat of demolition. The houseowners 
don't seem to have much capital.(as far as the social surveys show) 
although there is considerable cash inflow in the form of rent. Even 
so, it is likely that alternative, forms of investment — in trade, land, 
or sub-standard housing elsewhere in'the town, might have been more 
attractive than the possible gains from upgrading these houses. On 
the other hand, it is:also likely there would be scope and incentive for 
political leadership to organize, or encourage a certain amount of 'harambee' 
effort in Bondeni, especially if self-help groups, in the form of 
companies, might be able to buy up housing or further-develop a plot • 
as a form of investment as well as, community improvement. In this 
regard the social surveys taken, show that a good number of heads of 
households were interested in contributing to a mutual-aid housing scheme, 
including working a certain number of hours a week if that enabled them 
to get accommodation of the type they wanted or better still, an interest 
in income-generating rental accommodation. 
2) The costs of community break-up. Slum clearance programs 
destroy neighbourhoods and tend to disperse the inhabitants or at least 
reestablish people^  in different groupings. To the extent that the 
slum was a community and provided people with psycho-social support or 
presented certain kinds of opportunities, then slum clearance imposes 
considerable social costs on certain categories of individuals. 
This is a difficult question to consider in the Bondeni case 
in view of the information lacking. The Somali Location was recreated 
and thus the Somali component of that area was not broken up. The 
level of integration between the Somalis and their African tenants, 
given the historical conditions, was probably low. Even in Old Bondeni, 
I 
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there was something of a social and religious gap between landlords and 
their tenants, although it might not have been as clear cut. But on 
the other hand, just superficial analysis of the social survey data shows 
that even the tenant population in Old Bondeni contains a substantial 
core of people who have been very long-time residents of Nakuru and who 
have lived in Bondeni for most of all of that stay in the town. While 
this might simply reflect a lack of alternatives, it does suggest 
the existence of a commonality of experiences and interests that marks 
off the Bondeni population. 
Community is an ill-defined concept and indices of strength 
of community sentiment don't come easily out of social surveys; it is 
not surprising therefore that no assessment of this sort of social 
cost appears in redevelopment plans. The feeling among urban officials 
apparently is that these costs are minimal. I have no firm evidence to 
suggest otherwise in this case, but I think that planners should at least 
35 sensitize themselves to this problem. 
3) The costs of relocation. There are two related points to be 
considered in this regard. The first has to do with location, the 
second with zoning and licensing. 
Some 'slums', especially those in the centre of the city 
or one at a good access route at the former boundaries of an expanding town, 
have locational advantages. Because such land is scarce and at a 
premium there may be considerable pressure to redevelop the area and 
little likelihood that the site on which people will be rehoused 
will have equal locational advantages. In such cases, people will 
find themselves worse off than before in terms of the cost (in money, time, 
or convenience) of access to jobs or urban amenities and services. 
The fact that access might be worse has other possible 
implications. In developing countries certainly, it is likely 
that a considerable percentage of employment opportunities for slum 
dwellers are to be found in the informal sector. Poor accessibility of 
the housing development to which slum-dwellers are moved can have 
the effect of cutting down on the size of the client population, perhaps 
with serious socio-economic consequences. 
35- See in particular J. Bujra's revealing mor&graph on Pumwani, 
a somewhat comparable area of Nairobi. Bujra, J.M. Pumwani: The Politics 
of Property. Report on a SSRC project, mimeo 1973. 
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This factor of location and accessibility does not seem to.be 
a problem in the redevelopment of .Bondeni. The municipal estates built 
to rehouse people are roughly in the same area and can't be more than 
marginally less accessible from the central business district, the market, 
schools, and dispensaries, etc. They are served by the same bus lines 
and are about equally inconvenient, in relation to the industrial area, 
which is on the opposite side of town. The.old town area of Nakuru 
(which is the area within which municipal housing estates have been built) 
is fairly compact and thus these social costs of redevelopment are 
minimized. 
The second point in this argument also deals with a restriction 
in the range of opportunity- to be found in the new housing estate. 
Aside from the possibility that the new area will no.t be. as convenient 
or attractive for various kinds of enterprises, it is also likely that 
numbers of enterprises will be legally excluded by restrictive zoning or 
other means. This is certainly true to some extent in the case of 
Bondeni redevelopment. Municipal housing estates (while in a few cases 
they.,might have some provision for rented shops in the location and while' 
there are generally shopping centres developed adjacent to them to 
service a number) do offer relatively less accommodation for businesses, 
36 
control the type of business more closely, and often the rents for 
the businessmen, are much higher than they were in Old 3ondeni. 
4) The costs of 'urban removal'. Perhaps the most serious charge 
that is levelled against slum clearance programs is that often they do 
not rehouse the people they have displaced. This may occur for pure 
political motives — an urban authority may be interested in ; 
upgrading an area, and encouraging the present inhabitants to move out 
entirely, or for reasons of cost pressures, the municipality is not as 
able to supply housing, even subsidized housing, at/low rent as the former 
slum-dwellers can afford. In either case the effect, is similar and 
cumulatively disastrous. The stock of very low cost housing is 
reduced while the numbers-of people looking for such accommodation is 
36. It should be noted that businesses had been controlled in 
Old Bondeni. Before permission to use a-room for business purposes 
was granted, the African Affairs Committee considered whether the 
service was needed, whether the room could be spared, and so on. 
And certainly the separation of noxious,-noisy or otherwise objectionable 
types of businesses from residential areas is a thoroughly defensible 
procedure. 
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increased, -resulting in still greater overcrowding, more rapid decay of 
remaining very low-cost housing; the seeding of new and enlarged 
slums. 
The Council' s policy has always "been very clear; they have 
never' undertaken to' demolish unless they had alternative accommodation 
to offer people; better accommodation. But it has seldom been cheaper 
accommodation. Given the building standards which have to be met, an 
economic rent (which is what the Council charges) can only be so low. 
On the housing market as a whole, municipal housing is a bargain-.* it 
is cheaper than any comparable privately-owned housing in the central area. 
That is one reason there is an ever-growing list of applicants for 
public housing. But many residents of Old Bondeni have been paying 20/-
or 25/- a month. The only Council housing which is in that price range 
is substandard housing, primarily the Pangani Estates, which the 
Council is currently planning to replace. Again, a quick look at 
the social surveys shows that many people in Old Bondeni would be 
willing to pay more than their current rent for better accommodation 
but even this higher amount is less than the economic rent of many 
of the housing estates (the current rents are 35/- in Lumumba and 
Kaloleni B, ko/- in Flamingo I, 50/- in Kaloleni A, Kivumbini I & II,' 
Baharini, and so on up). One would expect" a considerable amount of 
sub-letting (with attendant crowding) in these Council estates, 
given low average incomes and the housing shortage, and in fact this 
would seem to be true." These factors all serve as a disincentive to 
demolish Old Bondeni, because the technologies for replacing it 
with ultra-low-cost housing even on a 'self-help1 basis are not 
available (unless and until current standards are revised). 
A Brief Consideration of the Politics of Slum Clearance. 
Urban development and, much more narrowly, slum clearance 
are political issues par excellence as they affect the position and 
prospects of various interest groups. The Bondeni demolitions' 
raised a number of points which we can now see to be significant 
in understanding the policies being pursued by Council. 
One very'broad question is what is the appropriate political 
arena for debate on urban redevelopment issues. This question is 
bound up'with the nature of political representation and the division 
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of administrative powers, a problem too complex to consider fully 
here. But it would he fair to say that the municipality would prefer 
.to thrash out urban policy within the confines of municipal government. 
In pre-Independence days this included the African Advisory Council 
and later the General Ward Council, as well as the Municipal Council and 
its various committees. Representation on the Council was specifically 
in terms of interest groups at the beginning of the period considered 
here, but changed to very broad geographical representation later and 
is now about to be tied to smaller defined areas. None of these three 
forms of representation serves a neighbourhood (although the last one 
goes in that direction) and so it is not surprising that representations 
on behalf of neighbourhood groups, like the Bondeni plotholders for 
exajjrple,. come in large measure from outside this political body. But 
it is mostly the fact that powers are divided among several authorities 
that encouraged interest groups to force the debate through a number 
of channels, dealing with whatever political leadership they felt they 
could influence. Thus,, in the case of the Somali Location redevelopment, 
the Somalis not only lobbied with the municipal administration but with 
the provincial administration, figures in the central government 
(like the Minister of Housing) and political proto-parties and pressure 
groups like the African District Congress and the Kenya Muslim League. » 
In that very crucial decisions, like the final authorization of the new 
plot and the loans for the tenant-purchase housing, were made at the, 
central level and not at the municipal one, there was scope for 
politicking among levels. The Somalis didn't do as well as they might 
have liked because there was a general desire on the part of various 
levels of government to minimize the fuss (given the overall political 
position of the colony vis-a-vis Britain during the Emergency), and 
there was quite good communication between the municipality, the 
provincial administration and Nairobi. It seems to me though that in 
an independent Kenya there is much greater opportunity for their African 
constituents to appeal to politicians at one level to help them in 
opposition to another group of politicians at another level and thus 
try to play off different levels of government so as to push policy 
in personally desirable directions. 
This homespun political analysis leads me back to the municipal 
level, which is the,one from which most of the initiatives in terms of 
redevelopment should stem. In the case of the Bondeni demolition 
schemes discussed here, it would seem that was so. However, I have 
argued above that political opposition was more difficult to organize then 
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under those circumstances than it would he now. The kinds of political 
constraints are much more complex today. Moreover the municipality 
cannot depend on very close coordination with the relevant decision-
makers at higher levels of government; local authorities fight for 
attention in what they often feel is an unresponsive Nairobi. In short 
I believe it has become harder for municipal authorities to take strong 
initiatives in such sensitive areas; rather they are in the position of 
having to react to initiatives taken by others., 
In this sense Bondeni represents just pari; of a problem that 
is overtaking the Council. There is in Nakuru, as in all growing towns 
in Kenya, a serious housing shortage. It becomes difficult to argue 
publically, even if there are good and sufficient reasons, that 
housing for which there is a demand should be pulled down, given the 
limited resources that the city has to work with. Council has 
resources, in law with which to go ahead and a responsibility to do so, 
but this is so politically unappealing that unless Bondeni were to 
be seen, as some sort of true danger, a source of evil and crime, or 
a proven centre of pestilence, there is little incentive to undertake 
demolition which has high political visibility. Organized interest 
groups, like the one the Somali houseowners represented, can portray the 
situation to their own advantage: poor wananchi who just want protection 
from a government that isn't offering them just compensation for their 
hardships. And in fact, the Council has, in their deliberations 
about final Bondeni demolition, paid a great deal of attention to 
satisfying the needs of the houseowner group even though this orientation 
is not the one which Nairobi would prefer and money for compensatory 
schemes for the plotholders will be difficult to get. 
The problem confronting the Municipal authorities is much 
wider now than, when this program was started. Then Bondeni was the major 
block of unacceptable accommodation. Now there is also a good deal of 
unauthorized substandard housing which the Council finds difficult to 
control for similar sorts of political reasons. That is, Bondeni 
redevelopment is now just a small part of a much larger development problem: 
viz., catching up with urban growth. Always being in a catch-up situation, 
the municipal government is in the unpleasant position of not fully 
controlling (even to the extent of its legal powers in relation to 
other authorities) the direction of planning or the pace of development ,. 
Unauthorized housing can be seen as a sort of unwelcome 'harambee' 
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effort which it becomes politically advisable to coopt rather than 
to oppose. Harambee projects, sanctioned or not, are all based on 
the hope that "the government will help those who help themselves." 
And certainly where the self-help (or "self-help" in the case of people 
with capital inverting in substandard rental housing) takes the form of 
housing, the municipality cannot for very long ignore it and hope it will 
fade away. 
In conclusion, I see the historory of Bondeni redevelopment as 
illustrating, in a progressive fasion, an increasingly reactive posture 
forced on the Municipal Council, somewhat against their intention. 
A careful reading of the events of the first stage of this redevelopment 
program (and I have attempted only a broad outline here) would give one a 
good perspective for considering the more complex problems that were 
germinating then. The reader Is invited to use the historical material 
presented here to work through this exercise in the hopes that will 
contribute to a greater critical understanding of and at the same time 
sympathy for the problems of municipal authorities in directing urban 
growth. 
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APPENDIX I 
Letter From "Ali "bin ALi" to the P.O. 2U/8/58. 
I came to this country in 1902 to visit my late father who 
was in this colony at that time. My father entered this country with 
the late Lord Delamere, he was serving him as headman and served him 
until the time of his death. I am an old man of about 89 years and 
have eleven children, seven are here and four are working for Her 
Majesty's Navy abroad, all of them were born here, one is a daughter, 
the rest are schooling. 
Secondly, one point which is not clear to us, we have eight 
shops and two hotels in Somali Location and their future position 
we respectfully would like to know. I niyself am owning a shop.... 
and would like the Council to build one extra room... ' and a shop to 
replace the one I got and I am prepared to pay the cost of the room and 
the shop.... 
Thirdly, my son is about to marry and would like a house on 
his own. Will it be possible to get a plot and to get the council to 
build a house if he is prepared to pay the value of the house-- ? 
• • • O • • • 
Letter From "Alhaj Mohammed" to- the P.C. 20/11/58. 
... I am now 99 years old ... 
I was a British Police Officer during the time of Queen 
Victoria's coronation and King Edward. On the coronation of King Edward, 
Ras Mukanin, the father of Haille Sellasie, the present Emperor of 
Ethiopia was going to Britain to attend the coronation.. He was accompanied 
by Sir Heriden who was then the British Consul at Ethiopia. I met them 
at Aden and I was driving them on the boat when they were to transfer to 
ship. I was still employed on the coronation of King George and also 
when. Transvaal was captured. 
In 1902 I was an officer in the ship Mihok during Madmullah's 
fight. We fought at a place called Durbo and another place called Illok. 
Our captain was injured and one officer killed. I was awarded medal for 
these fights. 
I first came to Kenya in 1911 and several times I returned to 
Aden and again came back. I had excellent documents awarded to me but 
when the Italians captured Somaliland they seized from me all my 
documents and former passport. 
I am now blind and had several operations performed on my 
stomach which is still very bad. For nearly.8 years now "Rashid" of 
Nakuru Somali Location helped me with room to sleep and food. But now as 
"Rashid's" house is. faced with demolition I am begging the government ... 
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APPENDIX II 
Suggestions for the Development of the African Population of Nakuru 
During the Forthcoming Five Years 1954-59. Memorandum prepared 2/12/53 
and reviewed at the meeting of the African Affairs Committee on 18/1/54. 
l) Housing. 
I suggest that all existing African housing, throughout the 
municipality,-, that r fails to conform to the minimum standards to "be 
decided "by the health authorities', be demolished...,. "'.'.' „ 
When designing housing estates every effort should be made 
to.provide accommodation suitable or adaptable for use by families, 
and rents be adjusted throughout housing schemes so that family 
houses are. subsidized from rents received from bachelor type housing. 
. Every encouragement should be given to employers and 
individuals to build houses for their staff and their own use, but 
the erection of private "lodging houses" should be severely restricted. 
When planning new estates it will be appreciated that the 
period -under review will undoubtedly see a sharp increase in African 
wages, the obvious results of which will be as follows :-
a) a general reduction in staff, particularly in the lower grades*, 
b) the necessity for the provision of less housing than would appear 
necessary at present; 
c) an increase in the ability of employers and individuals to pay 
economic rents for better quality housing; 
d) a greater desire for a more individual type of house design. 
Suggested phasing of housing: 
Phase I 1954. Complete number 2 housing scheme and demolish the 
section of Bondeni bounded by Location road,' Kiberenge Road, Kinyanjui 
Road, and Sumner Road.. Move these displaced residents into housing 
scheme.. 
Phase II. 1955. In the cleared area, erect flats for families in the 
high and middle income groups presently residing in the housing schemes. 
These will make room for people displaced by the demolition of a 
section of Bondeni bounded by Kiberenge Road, Kinyanjui Road, 
Sumner Road, and Shuleni Road. 
Phase III 1956. In the newly cleared area, erect family style houses 
for high wage group families and transfer these from the flats. Move 
any remaining middle wage families from the estates to. the flats 
which should leave the housing estates with, mostly, single low wage 
earners. This method will admittedly involve a considerable amount, of. 
movement but this will occur in any case as the population sorts itself 
out into various strata and people move into the accommodation they 
consider most suitable. 
Phase IV 1957- Erect more flats and family houses in East 
Bondeni. 
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Phase V 1958. Erect more housing of the type built in number 1 
scheme if necessary. 
Parallel to the schemes I would propose an area of 50 plots 
planned to permit the erection of houses of the Beeston type to be 
replaced by permanent dwellings in 10 years. 
I would propose also a survey -of servants accommodation in 
European and Asian areas with a view to a reduction of the number 
of servants living on the plot. 
In conclusion I would suggest that the use of the word 
'Location* to describe African residential areas be dropped and that 
such areas be named and regarded as village suburbs within the municipality. 
2) Village Units 
( This section deals with the structure of village units, 
village committees and the general ward council that was to act as a 
liason between the villages and the council.) 
3) Education 
This is, without question, the most valuable weapon available 
to a local authority in their planned development of the African 
population towards a full sense of their civic responsibility, but 
unfortunately at present local authorities have only a small share in 
the administration of schools within their area. 
.... Every effort should be made to take over full responsibility 
for African education within the municipality at nursery school, 
primary school and intermediate school levels and also to undertake 
parallel technical training and evening classes. 
No other single factor is likely to help more to promote a 
hardworking and civically minded African than the knowledge that by 
his labour his children are receiving a sound education, and he is 
prepared to submit to much increased taxation in order to achieve this... 
4) Medical Services. 
It is government policy that local authorities should be 
requested to take over the responsibility for certain medical services. 
Our program involves the provision of the following facilities: 
a) a general dispensary 
b) a maternity hospital starting with 2k beds 
c) the conversion of the existing maternity into a staff clinic and 
laboratory 
d) an innoculation centre; 
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5) Social Welfare. 
With the African population well-housed, healthy, efficiently 
and closely administered and first class educational facilities 
available for his children, the foundations for a more stable African 
community will have been laid. But these amenities are of little value 
unless adequate attention is paid to the filling in of their leisure 
hours with clean and healthy activity.... to achieve the status of a 
town to which the African is anxious to come, settle in and work hard 
for. 
6) Raee Relations. 
...Better race relations cannot be achieved by legislation 
but a tremendous amount can be achieved by local effort. An improvement 
in living standards will enable the African to meet the other communities 
on a more equal footing ... 
. .In Kenya the emphasis should be on convergence and not 
parallel development of the races. 
* 
Wherever it is possible to bring the races together in a friendly 
atmosphere, special efforts should be made, and in this connection the 
sportsground is one place where early success can be achieved. 
I would suggest that every effort be made by the municipal 
council in conjunction with local trades associations to_p>ermit 
Africans, by competitive examination or other means, to enter higher or 
more responsible posts in the town. Once the African is convinced that 
he can rise by sheer merit to the highest post, a better atmosphere will 
prevail. But the early stages of such progress must be marked by great 
patience and sympathy on the part of the employer. 
7) Finance. • .• 
...That a greater measure of financial responsibility be 
given to the General Ward Council which should be given status 
equivalent to an African District Council whereby they could raise 
by cess.licenses, fees etc. funds . . . . 
This principle of financial."segregation" should, I 
suggest, last only during the period of convergence and disappear when 
a measure of integration has been achieved, and the position of the 
African as an essential and important citiven of the town has been 
accepted. 
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APPENDIX III 
Judgement Misc. Case 5 of 1958, Resident Magistrate's Court at Nakuru 
27/9/58. On the licenses of plot 1 section 1 and plot 1 section 
II. 
The court made a detailed inspection of the whole Somali 
Location... and the only two rooms which approached the standards 
required to make them fit for human habitation were 2 rooms in another 
building which a Somali Elder informed me were occupied by himself and 
his family. The conditions enjoyed by his adjoining African tenants 
were pathetically in contrast. 
...It remains to consider the questions of hardship, alternative 
accommodations and reasonableness. 
...For many years he and his fellow Somali plot holders 
have, I am informed, been paying only a peppercorn rent of 4-0/- per annum which 
covered only conservancy charges whilst they themselves have waxed fat from 
exhorbitant rents amounting to hundreds of shillings per month from their 
African tenants. It is not part of the duty of the court to protect the 
illegitimate interests of persons who cannot in the Court's view be said to 
be earning a livelihood but are merely collecting rents and have shown not 
the slightest interest ever in alleviating by improvement, repair or 
otherwise the unfortunate lot of their African tenants. 
...As regards the Somali plot holders (of these two plots) the 
question of alternative accommodation does not arise since they are housed 
elsewhere. As regards the African tenants I have inspected.. Housing 
Scheme 4.... It is an understatement to describe such accommodation as 
suitable only and the council may well be proud of the type, size and 
design of this estate, c.. 
As regards "reasonableness" it is quite apparent that 
throughout despite obstructive tactics by the plot holders who are almost 
as devoid of any legal rights as they are of moral, the council have acted 
towards the Somali plot holders far beyond their deserts with commendable 
generosity .... 
